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Abstract 
Several scholars have suggested that honesty, honor, fairness and other traditional values 
play a vital role in making capitalism and democracy function (Fukuyama 1995; Zak 
2008). Others have recognized that capitalism and democracy reward greed and reinforce 
antisocial manipulators (Hayes-Roth 2011a). Some believe that enterprises can 
reconstruct themselves profitably around the principles of integrity and honoring one’s 
word (Jensen 2011). Our research complements their work by showing how lies 
materially harm business prospects, making it possible to increase value through truth 
telling. In the Internet Age, both harmful and salutary information flow at increasing 
rates, amplifying the latent value of truth (Hayes-Roth 2011c). Promiscuous customers 
have little loyalty to vendors and shun untrustworthy ones as too risky. The Internet will 
soon offer improved mechanisms to identify liars and truth-tellers and to filter out 
untrustworthy messages automatically. Businesses and other organizations will need to 
seize the opportunities to significantly improve their truthfulness quotients. Quantitative 
measurements of the value of truth telling will help management steer in a positive 
direction.  
Introduction 
“Any smart person learns the importance of lying by age 10” – Anon. 
 
“We want to be proud of Enron and to know that it enjoys a reputation for fairness and 
honesty and that it is respected” – Enron’s ethics code 
In the Internet Age, when information memes spread at virally epidemic speeds, a 
reputation can be destroyed overnight. Much of business history was written in a different 
age, when information moved slowly, with great friction. In that world, powerful people 
and companies could control release and limit dissemination. The rise of the World Wide 
Web, social networks, and instant communications has destroyed that stable foundation. 
In a competitive, global, Internet-powered economy, every customer decision can be 
affected by quickly disseminated and shared information. In this new arena, the 
consequences of lying and dissembling can be swift and fatal (observe Congressman 
Anthony Weiner’s demise; see also the downfall of BP’s CEO Tony Hayward). A single 
bad review on the Internet can destroy competitive prospects for sales. Where “honesty” 
might have previously been a nice-to-have ethical badge, a lack of integrity now threatens 
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mortal risk. Hence, an explicit recognition, embrace, and monitoring of honesty is a 
policy now required for survival. That will require a change from the top down.  
Amar and Stevenson wrote in a 1990 Harvard Business Review article that while a few 
business people lie, most are honest because trusting others increases their opportunities 
and reduces their costs. So while honesty doesn’t pay, it’s a preferred business 
orientation. 
 
More recent experience casts great doubt on the idea that most business people are 
honest. Several major businesses have crashed and burned in fantastic scandals, the entire 
mortgage industry is suspect, and the public views much of the financial sector as 
untrustworthy. More generally, the public distrusts corporate executives. Jensen and his 
colleagues have surveyed the business literature (Erhard 2010; Jensen 2011) and have 
reached a number of pertinent conclusions. (1) Business leaders routinely lie and cheat. 
(2) Lying hurts business performance. (3) Honoring one’s word would be good for 
business but will require a major change. 
 
Scholars of culture such as White (1969) and Dawkins (1990) hold that the best way to 
understand human culture is to focus on which ideas (“memes”) control resources. The 
Internet Age amplifies this observation. Hundreds of millions of people now interact 
socially and conduct commerce in a digital (virtual) environment. In this “infosphere”, 
perceptions, judgments, and decisions are powerfully shaped by information events 
(“messages”). Increasingly, business is digitally conducted, based on individuals’ 
considerations and choices among alternatives represented entirely through messages 
about the candidates and their competitors.  
 
Until the convergence and exponential growth of information and communication, 
businesses had great control over messages. Information travelled slowly and with great 
friction. PR and advertising could be aimed at target consumers with great effect. In 
addition, the costs to customers of finding and selecting an alternative supplier were 
much higher. These conditions contributed to a virtuous cycle of loyalty, where 
businesses could cultivate loyal customers, providing them better information and 
service, and extracting premium margins and recurrent revenues (Reichheld 1990; 
Reichheld 1993; Reichheld 2001). Many information services born in the Internet Age 
aim to create loyalty and lock-in through superior information experiences (Urban 2000). 
 
Because barriers to entry now are so low for suppliers of traditional products and services 
and because so many companies have no distinctive differentiation, many vendors 
compete to sell each type of product and service. The Internet enables these suppliers to 
announce their wares to all, at very low cost. Similarly, the Internet and its search engines 
make it easy for customers to seek out vendors and deals. This increases the number of 
promiscuous customers, who have no significant loyalty to any particular vendor. The 
basic decision logic of the promiscuous customer seeking a particular product is to 
choose the best value among all trustworthy or low-risk suppliers. Customers rule out 
untrustworthy or risky suppliers from consideration (Ha 2004; Resnick 2006; Vallens 
2008). Any vendor who has a perceived problem with lying, cheating, or 
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misrepresentation is eliminated from consideration (Anonymous, Money, 2010). A four 
or five-star vendor rating is vital. A badge of ethical business or technology 
trustworthiness increases conversions markedly (Lund 2010; Hayes-Roth 2011b). 
Companies with despoiled reputations quickly fall behind.  
 
New social networking environments such as Facebook and Yelp! make it easy for 
dissatisfied consumers to spread negative messages to others. When received from trusted 
sources, these negative messages are difficult to neutralize. A single website such as 
RipOffReport.com provides thousands of negative messages, grouped by industry, 
company, and locale. For example, in June 2011, a search for negative messages about  
“lying” by “mortgage companies” generated 2461 individual messages. If promiscuous 
customers seek to avoid untrustworthy companies, they will find it easy to generate lists 
of lying businesses to avoid. 
 
The promiscuous consumer can use several different models to assess riskiness or 
trustworthiness of a company in comparison to alternative suppliers. With most of these 
models, even two or three negative messages will eliminate a company from 
consideration.  
 
As available information grows exponentially, we all face an infoglut that is not 
manageable merely by working faster (Denning 2006a). This condition creates incentives 
for information “curating” so a customer can quickly find true, high-valued information. 
The value of information derives from its ability to improve the customer’s opportunities. 
Negative messages that avoid risky transactions will be valued (Hayes-Roth 2006).  
 
So the coming decade will see businesses competing based mostly on messages about 
them. Positive messages, to the extent they reflect uniform customer satisfaction, will be 
increasingly important.  High integrity will become synonymous with honoring “one’s 
word.” This will place a premium on honesty in all transactions, including honestly 
admitting the causes of mistakes and honestly undertaking remedies. Those who think 
they can succeed by hiding errors, cheating stakeholders, or telling half-truths will find 
themselves increasingly scorched by white-hot Internet glare. As with most other 
principal business objectives, this type of managed outcome will require top-down 
objectives, measures, auditing and incentives. The good news, for businesses, employees, 
stockholders, and citizens is that in the age of open uncontrolled observation and 
reporting, honesty is the best policy.  
 
At this time, we should revise the “managers’ handbook” to illuminate and leverage the 
value of truth telling. Truth telling is good business, vital for retaining loyal customers 
and successfully competing for promiscuous ones. The Internet Age will make honesty 
pay handsomely. 
 
Understanding and Modeling the Value of Truth Telling 
 
Economists have long understood how information and value intertwine. Hayek’s major 
contribution was to argue how prices reflect distributed information about supply and 
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Figure 0. The Enterprise attains value from 
stakeholders informed by the Infosphere. 
 
demand, and how the production of that information could not effectively be centralized 
(Hayek 1937; Hayek 1945). In a related way, the Internet has spread information quickly 
and extensively that affects billions of buying decisions, each made in a decentralized 
way. When faced with options, the buyer accesses information about the candidates to 
decide which option to purchase. 
 
Most enterprises today operate in distributed ways, in networked and distributed 
environments. The information that surrounds these enterprises fuels the decisions of 
those within the enterprise and those that interact with the extended enterprise (Denning 
2006b). 
 
Figure 1 shows the primary 
stakeholders who contribute to 
Enterprise Value. We are focusing 
in this paper primarily on 
Customers and Customer 
Prospects. Customers contribute to 
Enterprise Value through profitable 
purchases. All stakeholders are 
awash in information about the 
Enterprise, especially that which is 
available through the Internet and 
related communication media. Each 
stakeholder attends to a small 
fraction of available information 
and uses that to inform decisions. 
Mostly people outside the employ 
or control of the Enterprise produce 
the content of the infosphere. 
Negative memes in the infosphere are potentially lethal to the Enterprise, because they 
significantly and adversely impact on decisions about whether to buy what the Enterprise 
is selling. Prospective customers will shun suppliers with negative reputations. Investor 
Prospects face a similar “buying” decision, and they too will avoid buying stock in a 
company viewed as risky or untrustworthy. Employees and suppliers, and prospects in 
these categories, consider information about the company in a similar way, and negative 
information will make it more difficult for the Enterprise to close “sales” with those 
stakeholders as well. 
 
Figure 2 contrasts how loyal customers and promiscuous customers make purchasing 
decisions. Loyal customers are very valuable to enterprises, because they will sustain 
recurrent purchases for years and also overlook some negative messages (Reichheld 
1993; Reichheld 1990; Reichheld 2001). When they compare their preferred seller to the 
alternatives, loyal customers will choose the preferred seller unless there is a big 
disadvantage in perceived ratings of the sellers.  Promiscuous customers, on the other 
hand, are price and value-sensitive. They have access to much information about 
alternative sellers and no a priori bias. Promiscuous customers will eliminate sellers they 
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Figure 1.  Loyal customers and promiscuous customers 
use different rules for choosing sellers. 
 
deem risky, usually based on negative or disconfirming information. They will then 
choose the best value offer from the sellers that they believe are trustworthy. 
 
The rise of Promiscuous 
Customers parallels the spread 
of the Internet for several 
reasons. First, e-shopping was 
made easy and ubiquitous as the 
Internet became the dominant 
form of communication. The 
World Wide Web and 
supporting technologies were 
important, and after a decade of 
experience with companies such 
as Amazon, consumers became 
accustomed to seeking most of 
their information on-line about 
goods and prices. In addition, 
sales tax advantages and lower 
margins trained consumers to 
expect bargains on the Internet. 
 
Even as the great recession continues, the shift to e-shopping is continuing. For example, 
one organization that measures Internet-based sales reported (Anonymous, comScore, 
2011), “The second quarter of 2011 saw a continuation of this year’s solid double-digit 
growth trends in online spending, well ahead of the rate of growth in consumers’ overall 
spending… As a result, it’s clear that consumers are continuing to shift to the online 
channel, with almost $1 in every $10 of discretionary spending now occurring online. E-
commerce’s benefits of convenience and lower prices continue to be the drivers of the 
shift.” 
 
At the same time, purchasing from distant strangers strengthened the consumers’ sense of 
personal responsibility for getting adequate information. This amplified the consumer’s 
awareness of commodity qualities and further reduced brand and retailer influence. The 
net result is that buyers feel empowered and reinforced for making informed decisions, 
and the Internet makes it easy for them to both get the information they need and transact 
the purchases. If customers have loyalty today, it’s increasingly based on accomplishing 
satisfying transactions, with high reliability, at low costs with e-tailers.  
 
Figure 3 shows two common psychological models of how customers deal with negative 
or “offending” experiences. The upper model shows that a trusting customer will tolerate 
one or two offending messages, but after that the offending seller basically “strikes out.” 
In the lower model, the customer dynamically adjusts his or her rating of a seller’s 
trustworthiness based on events (messages received). Offending events reduce the 
trustworthiness in proportion to an aversiveness coefficient (“beta”). Reinforcing events 
increase the trustworthiness rating in proportion to a reward coefficient (“alpha”). The 
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Figure 2. Customers downgrade a seller's rating 
in response to negative experiences or messages. 
 
actual size of a change in either direction, Δ(t), is also proportionate to the available room 
for change, 1-RS(t) upward or RS(t) downward. 
 
The two learning models in Figure 3 
provide a basis for understanding 
how Enterprises can lose value when 
their stakeholders receive negative 
messages about them. These 
negative messages can result from 
negative experiences, as when a 
promised product is delivered late or 
in poor condition. Or the negative 
messages can simply be read or 
heard. This kind of negative “buzz” 
can be deadly for a business. When 
prospective customers investigate a 
product or service, they pay especial 
attention to rip-off reports, negative 
ratings, and other “flames.”  Average 
positive ratings can help, but there’s 
little cost to a consumer to be risk 
averse with their own purchasing 
dollars.  The two-strike or three-
strike model at the top of Figure 3 reflects a common tendency of people to give a second 
chance but not a fourth chance. Some people live by the “fool me once, shame on you; 
fool me twice, shame on me” rule. That’s what we call the “two-strike” rule.  The “three 
strike” rule causes a prospect to write off completely anyone who disappoints him or her 
three times. If these rules are operating, a second or a third negative message can reduce 
the Enterprise’s value for that prospect 100% to zero.  
 
In contrast to the all-or-none loss of trustworthiness rating in the two-strike and three-
strike rules, a more gradual and continuous learning law is modeled at the bottom of 
Figure 3. Under that learning model, there’s no single final strike. Rather, each positive 
event increases the “trustworthiness rating” of the seller, and each negative experience 
lowers it. Exactly how much and how fast the learned rating moves is determined by 
some parameters that can be influenced by genetics, mood, appetite, and saliency of the 
events. In general, positive experiences move ratings up a fraction and negative 
experiences move ratings down. If the rating of a seller S at time t, RS(t), is scaled 
between 0 and 1, the amount available for a move upward is 1 – RS(t), and the amount 
available for a move downward is RS(t). Usually, negative experiences are felt more 
keenly, because of a principle of “aversion”. In our work then, we use a beta that is 
generally twice the magnitude of alpha, so that downward moves happen more quickly 
than upward moves. In contrast with the two-strike or three-strike rules, this continuous 
learning model moves ratings up and down with positive and negative experiences, and 
moderately amplifies the significance of negative messages. 
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Figure 3. If negatives have typical aversiveness (2:1), 
it takes eight positives to offset a single negative. 
 
Figure 4 shows how 
challenging it is for positive 
messages to overcome negative 
messages, when the aversion 
coefficient is at least twice as 
large as the reward coefficient. 
Assuming that trustworthiness 
ratings below 80% are 
uncompetitive, each enterprise 
needs at least 8 times as many 
salient positive messages for 
each salient negative message. 
These are very conservative 
estimates because offending 
messages are potent and 
learners move more quickly to 
shun sources of  aversive 
stimuli than they adapt to seek 
out sources of rewarding ones. 
Because lies, deceptions, and other failures to honor one’s word will normally be viewed 
as offending messages, there is little room for negative messages if the enterprise desires 
a positive reputation. Truth telling is mandatory.  
 
Mechanisms for Amplifying Truth Telling and Multiplying the Value of Truth 
 
In some of our other research (Hayes-Roth 2011b), we have investigated how sellers can 
increase the salience of true messages they want to deliver to audiences. Examples might 
be advertisements for products, services or even political candidates. We experimentally 
evaluated the ability of advertisements to influence consumer or voter behavior under 
three different conditions. In the control condition, the advertisers made plausible 
assertions in typical ways. An example might be that “this running shoe outperforms all 
others” or that “Jones has a track record of working across the aisle for bipartisan 
objectives”. In the second condition, such statements could be adorned with images of 
various seals that connote increased trustworthiness. One kind of seal would be a gold-
star shield or an impressive looking medallion. We call these images “generic seals” 
because they actually signify little and promise nothing. In the third and final condition, 
we affixes a “TruthSeal” mark to objective claims that had been vetted and carried 
guarantees against falsification. The truth-sealed statements actually offered bounties to 
challengers who could present data that would falsify them. In this way, we conveyed to 
the audience that statements bearing TruthSeal marks justified a greater level of trust. 
 
Our results were overwhelming and held across all kinds of selling categories, whether 
products, services or political candidates. All seals made a substantial difference, and 
TruthSeal marks influenced decisions significantly more than generic seals. A TruthSeal 
increased the odds of a consumer choosing that option by a factor of 4 to 1 over 
comparable advertised options that lacked any such seals. 
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We live in a world of information glut (Denning, 2006a). On the one hand, we have ready 
access to more information than we can possibly digest or even browse. In addition, we 
are bombarded with advertising and promotional messages producing a veritable sense of 
attack or overload. People would clearly benefit if they could easily filter information 
based on its quality, such as automatically eliminating falsehoods or ungrounded claims 
or highlighting vetted statements guaranteed to be true. Because of the need and potential 
value, we anticipate this kind of filtering eventually will become common.  
Our data make it clear that authors, advertisers and publishers can significantly increase 
the impact of their messages in contexts where consumers and decision makers are 
influenced by the credibility of information claims. This will be salutary for authors, 
sellers, and candidates who have truthful statements to make. The use of such seals to 
provide ubiquitous meta-data about the credibility of information could usher in an era 
where everybody can more easily and usefully filter facts from untrue claims.  
 
Truth-value markings can cut both ways, however. Negative statements about companies 
and candidates will be more harmful if they are trusted, and TruthSeal marks can be used 
to amplify the credibility and impact of such statements. While many companies have 
operated creatively in the gray area between fact and fiction, occupied mostly by 
advertising and public relations, their freedom to thrive by staying in that area will 
decline significantly in the coming years. Objective, vetted claims will stand out, and 
when they carry guarantees and award bounties to challengers who can falsify them, 
many more people will become involved in the activity of truth scouting. This creates an 
opportunity for those who wish to leverage truth telling. It erodes the value and long-term 
viability of those who cannot or will not compete on factual bases. 
As the world comes to demand truthful, high-quality information, business opportunities 
arise for those who can assess or curate information. Some businesses and non-profits 
have already moved into this arena. As digital information becomes more dominant, 
search engines will increasingly need to help users find valued information, lest they 
become mere relay stations for spam and low-quality “content farms.”  The new value 
potential of truthful information can reshape information markets as well as accelerate 
new management practices.  
Managers have a vital interest in sustaining business reputations and profits, free 
enterprise, and democracy. These all benefit directly from a focus on truth telling. Truth 
telling should be a principal measured objective for all Internet-age leaders.  
Conclusion 
Businesses need to adopt innovative approaches for the full range of internal and external 
communications to measure, monitor and assure an increasing level of honesty. Jensen 
and his colleagues (Erhard 2010; Jensen 2011) have hit a similar theme with their 
emphasis on Integrity and equating integrity with “honoring one’s word.” Their work 
shows that integrity failures have many costs and that nearly all companies and people 
are in a state of non-integrity. We want to build on those insights by combining them 
with several others. In particular, we point to a rise in “promiscuous customers,” namely 
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those who are not long-term loyal customers, typified by Internet shoppers. These 
customers are price and value-sensitive. They avoid risky sellers and transactions, 
seeking the best bargain among sellers they see as trustworthy. We introduced a few 
simple models that show how high-integrity interactions are vital for sellers to capture 
these buyers, as well as being vital to retaining “loyal” customers, who are even more 
valuable. These models show that events that offend customers significantly harm the 
prospect for selling to them. Dishonesty is a significant source of such offending events, 
and one that in practice could be entirely controlled by effective management techniques. 
In short, enterprise value is becoming significantly more sensitive to negative 
information, and the enterprise that doesn’t work to control that is asleep at the switch.  
Businesses will want to participate in, affiliate with, and contribute directly to the 
“curating” of trusted information, because this will enable them to create and exploit 
competitive opportunities for trustworthiness, distinction, and differentiation. Customers 
are seeking reliable information to distinguish good and bad actors, so there’s an 
opportunity to gain advantage from “white hat” status.  
Finally, as information volumes continue to grow exponentially, new filters and search 
algorithms will evolve that will increasingly cater to the “tastes” of their users. Some will 
prefer entertainment and confirming “comfort” data. Others will prefer valuable, 
significant, opportunity-enabling trustworthy information. Businesses will need different 
methods and approaches to serve these two different types of taste. Truth telling will be 
vital for the second type. Customers making choices based on opportunity, value, and 
trustworthiness will rely on the second type of information for those transactions. 
These ideas will play to the strengths of companies that like to compete on brand 
promises, especially service quality, reliability, and safety. Companies such as Google, 
Amazon and Apple routinely seek to sustain their images of honesty, quality, and 
superior service. Many traditional companies, such as P&G and Southwest, also pride 
themselves on honestly producing superior products, and they should welcome the rise of 
public sensitivity to truth telling.  
The financial sector is afflicted currently with poor brand image, reputation, ethics and 
morality. There would seem to be an opportunity to build new competitive advantages 
around straight talk, honest dealings, and guaranteed trustworthiness.  
We view each enterprise as a system operating within the information environment. In 
that infosphere, true and false information generate the rewarding or offending events 
that shape the consumer’s trust.  If leaders aren’t managing themselves against objectives 
of honesty, they are probably practicing “business as usual,” where honesty is a second-
order concern. That lax attitude won’t be adequate in the new environment that punishes 
misrepresentations quickly and severely. Mistrust is a poison we don’t want to experience 
reactively. We need to prevent it proactively. 
The key idea is that valued bits of information are those that customers will seek out, and 
the marketplace will get better at delivering those. Deceptive, misleading, and 
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inappropriate behavior will be reported to those who want to assess the trustworthiness of 
potential partners. Honesty in action will improve what’s reported. Truthfulness in 
communication will avoid compounding problems. Messages marked as true will out-
compete messages marked as false in the competitive infosphere.  
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